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The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or
belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about “introspection axioms” such as the 4 and
5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory
has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken
for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A
believes about what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason
just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent
to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In
this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of
multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like 2a2b2a p but
not formulas like 2a2a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K
or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of
any new agent-alternating formulas—in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast,
we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold
with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas.
1 Introduction
The classic early works on epistemic logic in philosophy by Hintikka [13] and Lenzen [19] focused on
the logic of knowledge and belief for a single agent,1 especially on controversies about “introspection
axioms”: for example, if an agent knows p, does she know that she knows p (formalized by the 4
axiom of modal logic, Ka p→ KaKa p)? If an agent does not know p, does she know that she does not
know p (formalized by the 5 axiom of modal logic, ¬Ka p→ Ka¬Ka p)? By contrast, the later literature
on epistemic logic in computer science (e.g., [21, 5]) and game theory (e.g., [2]) focused on multi-agent
epistemic reasoning, especially as required for coordination between agents or strategic reasoning against
opponents. In this literature, the single-agent introspection principles formalized by the 4 and 5 axioms
are largely taken for granted (for exceptions, see, e.g., [25, 17, 15]). In the relevant multi-agent scenarios,
it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about what agent B believes about what agent
A believes (BaBbBa p); but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what
agent A believes (BaBa p). Consider the following famous examples of multi-agent epistemic reasoning.
Muddy children We assume familiarity with the 3-agent Muddy Children puzzle where two children
have mud on their foreheads (see, e.g., § 1.1 of [5]). The following is a derivation in the bimodal version
of the minimal normal modal logic K showing how one of the muddy children comes to realize that
1Only §§ 4.1-4.6 and § 4.13 of [13] and pp. 59, 66, and 70 of [19] contain discussion of multi-agent formulas.
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she is muddy.2 Note that (i) no introspection axioms are used, and in fact (ii) modalities occur only
“alternatingly,” in the sense that no occurrence of a modality for an agent i has scope over another
occurrence of a modality for i without an intervening occurrence of some modality for an agent j 6= i.
(a) 2122((¬m1∧¬m3)→ m2) (assumption: 1 knows that 2 knows that at least one child is muddy)
(b) 2122¬m3 (assumption: 1 knows that 2 can see 3, who is not muddy)
(c) 21(¬m1→22¬m1) (assumption: 1 knows that 2 can see 1)
(d) 21¬22m2 (assumption: 1 knows that 2 did not step forward after the parent’s first question)
1. 22((¬m1∧¬m3)→ m2)→ (22(¬m1∧¬m3)→22m2) (K axiom)
2. 2122((¬m1∧¬m3)→ m2)→21(22(¬m1∧¬m3)→22m2) (from (1) by RM)
3. 21(22(¬m1∧¬m3)→22m2) (from (a) and (2) by PL)
4. 21(¬22m2→¬22(¬m1∧¬m3)) (from (3) using PL and RM)
5. 21¬22(¬m1∧¬m3) (from (d) and (4) by K and PL)
6. ¬22(¬m1∧¬m3)→¬(22¬m1∧22¬m3) (theorem of K)
7. 21¬22(¬m1∧¬m3)→21¬(22¬m1∧22¬m3) (from (6) by RM)
8. 21¬(22¬m1∧22¬m3) (from (5) and (7) by PL)
9. 21¬22¬m1 (from (b) and (8) using PL, Nec, and K)
10. 21m1 (from (c) and (9) using PL, Nec, and K)
Backward induction We assume familiarity with the classic backward induction reasoning in exten-
sive form games (see, e.g., [22, § 6.2]). In [26], Vilks provides a syntactical derivation of backwards
induction in the bimodal version of the modal logic KT, which we reproduce below. Again note that (i)
no introspection axioms are used, and in fact (ii) modalities occur only “alternatingly” as above.
1
a
2
b
(4,2)
d
(2,4)
e
2
c
(1,1)
f
(3,3)
g
• p1 := ab∧¬ac∧bd∧¬be∧¬c f ∧¬cg (both play left)
• p2 := ab∧¬ac∧¬bd∧be∧¬c f ∧¬cg (1 play left, 2 play right)
• p3 := ¬ab∧ac∧¬bd∧¬be∧ c f ∧¬cg (1 play right, 2 play left)
• p4 := ¬ab∧ac∧¬bd∧¬be∧¬c f ∧ cg (both play right)
2‘PL’ stands for propositional logic, ‘Nec’ stands for the necessitation rule, and ‘RM’ stands for the monotonicity rule that
if ϕ → ψ is a theorem, then so is 2iϕ → 2iψ . Note that in the derivation, RM is only applied to theorems of the logic. For
example, to obtain (4), RM is applied to the theorem (ϕ → ψ)→ (¬ψ →¬ϕ) where ϕ :=22(¬m1∧¬m3) and ψ :=22m2.
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• q := d >1 e∧d >1 f ∧d >1 g∧e >1 f ∧g >1 e∧g >1 f ∧e >2 d∧d >2 f ∧g >2 d∧e >2 f ∧e >2
g∧g >2 f (players’ preferences)
• G := (p1∨ p2∨ p3∨ p4)∧q (description of the game)
(a) 21G (assumption: 1 knows the game)
(b) 21((bd∨be)→32be) (assumption: 1 knows that if 2 is at b then 2 considers the move be possible)
(c) 21((c f ∨ cg)→32cg) (assumption: similar to (b))
(d) 22((ab∨ac)→31ac) (assumption: similar to (b))
(e) 21((e >2 d∧32be)→¬bd) (assumption: follows from assuming 1 knows that 2 is rational)
(f) 21((g >2 f ∧32cg)→¬c f ) (assumption: similar to (e))
(g)
(
21(ab↔ be)∧21(ac↔ cg)∧g>1 e∧31ac
)→¬ab (assumption: follows from 1 being rational)
1. 21(ab↔ be) (from (a), (b), and (e) using PL, Nec, and K)
2. 21(ac↔ cg) (from (a), (c), and (f) using PL, Nec, and K)
3. (ab∨ac)→31ac (from (d) by T)
4. G (from (a) by T)
5. ab∨ac (from (4) by PL)
6. 31ac (from (3) and (5) by PL)
7. ¬ab (from (g), (1), (2), (4), and (6) by PL)
8. ac (from (5) and (7) by PL)
9. ac↔ cg (from (2) by T)
10. ac∧ cg (from (8) and (9) by PL)
In general, in typical strategic form games a player needs to reason about the beliefs of her oppo-
nents, as which action is best for her depends on her opponents’ actions, which in turn depend on their
beliefs. On the other hand, reasoning about one’s own beliefs seems unnecessary, as the dependencies
just mentioned seem to be tight: which action is the best for a player depends on what her opponents’
actions are alone, which in turn depend on their beliefs over what their opponents’ actions are alone. We
can then iterate this reasoning, and it seems there is no place for reasoning about one’s own beliefs. In
Appendix A we provide a formalization of this idea using Kripke models of games in the style of [24]
and [4], where only formulas with no modality scoping immediately over a modality of the same agent
are used to ensure that rationalizable strategies are played.3
These considerations raise the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms
actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In particular, as motivated by the above examples,
we can ask: in situations where the agents and also the analyst only need to reason about formulas where
modalities occur only alternatingly, would the commonly debated introspection axioms still matter, in
the sense that assuming them allows us to derive more conclusions?
This question has indeed been partially investigated previously, though motivated not by the question
of whether introspection axioms may in practice be “irrelevant” but rather by the goal of devising efficient
3We are not arguing that introspection assumptions never matter in multi-agent epistemic reasoning. For example, it is
shown in [8, 18] that Aumann’s [1] theorem on agreeing to disagree fails without the assumption of positive introspection.
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reasoning algorithms for the system K45. In [16], it is explicitly stated (Lemma 5) that when restricted
to the fragment of the multi-agent language in which modalities occur only in the agent-alternating way,
K and K45 derive the same set of theorems.4 This facilitates reasoning in K45 since it is also known that
every formula is provably equivalent in K45 to an agent-alternating formula,5 which is then derivable in
K45 iff it is derivable K, making the efficient methods of deciding theoremhood in K applicable to K45.
Subsequently, the idea of agent-alternating formulas was also used in the axiomatization of refinement
quantification logics [10, 9] and in epistemic planning [14, 20, 6].
In this paper, we study the question more systematically. In § 2, we provide multiple ways to define
the agent-alternating formulas, which include formulas like 2a(2b p∧2b2aq) but not 2a(2b p∧2aq).
In § 3, we first provide a bisimulation notion for the fragment of agent-alternating formulas and then use
it to completely chart the relationships of the modal logics in the well-known “Modal Logic Cube” when
restricted to the fragment of agent-alternating formulas. We prove that if one starts with multi-agent K
or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any
new agent-alternating formula—in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show
that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to
a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas introduced in § 4. In § 5, we report on preliminary inves-
tigations of how these results are affected in the presence of a common belief operator in the language.
Finally, we conclude in § 6 with some directions for future research.
2 Agent-Alternating Formulas
Fix a set A of agents with |A| ≥ 2 and a countably infinite set Prop of proposition letters.
Definition 2.1. The language of multi-agent epistemic logic is defined inductively by
L 3 ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) |2aϕ
where p ∈ Prop and a ∈ A. Connectives→, ∨, and 3a are abbreviations as usual.
We adopt the standard definition of when one formula is a subformula of another.
Notation 2.2. For ϕ,ψ ∈L , let ϕ 4ψ indicate that ϕ is a subformula of ψ and ϕ ≺ψ that ϕ is a proper
subformula of ψ .
Intuitively, agent-alternating formulas are those formulas in which an operator 2a does not immedi-
ately scope over another operator 2a of the same agent a. We now offer two ways to precisely capture
this intuition, one using immediate subformulas and occurrences, and one using simultaneous induction.
Definition 2.3. For α,β ∈L , we say α is an immediate subformula of β , and write α ≺· β , if β is either
¬α , or (α ∧ γ) for some γ ∈ L , or (γ ∧α) for some γ ∈ L , or 2aα for some a ∈ A. Note that the
reflexive and transitive closure of ≺· is precisely 4.
For any ϕ ∈L , an occurrence type O of ϕ is a finite sequence 〈O1,O2, · · · ,Olen(O)〉 of formulas in
L such that Olen(O) = ϕ and for each i between 1 and len(O)− 1, Oi ≺· Oi+1. Let OC(ϕ) be the set of
occurrence types of ϕ and ≤ the prefix-extension relation: O≤ O′ iff O′ is a suffix of O. It is then easy
to see that 〈OC(ϕ),≤〉 is a (downward-growing) tree.
We call an occurrence type O of ϕ with O1 = α an α-occurrence of ϕ . If this α is 2aβ for some
β ∈L and a ∈ A, then we also call O a 2a-occurrence. We typically denote an α-occurrence by O[α].
4The authors refer to [11] for the proof of this lemma, though we are unable to locate an explicit proof there.
5In Appendix B, we show the semantic counterpart of this proposition and further show that 4 and 5 are in a sense necessary.
See also Theorem 1 of [23] for an early precursor of this result.
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Definition 2.4. A formula ϕ ∈L is an agent-alternating formula iff for any a ∈ A and any two different
2a occurrences O[2aα] and O[2aβ ] such that O[2aα] ≤ O[2aβ ], there is a b ∈ A \ {a} and a 2b-
occurrence O[2bγ] of ϕ such that O[2aα]≤O[2bγ]≤O[2aβ ]. In other words, ϕ is agent alternating iff
in the tree 〈OC(ϕ),≤〉, between any two 2a-occurrences, there is a 2b-occurrence for some b ∈ A\{a}.
Example 2.5. Assuming a,b,c are different elements in A, examples of agent-alternating formulas in-
clude:
2a p, 2a2b p, 2a2b2a p, 2a2b2c p, 2a(p∧2bq).
Non-examples include:
2a2a p, 2a2b2a2a p, 2a(2b2a p∧2aq).
We now give an equivalent inductive definition of the set of agent-alternating formulas.
Definition 2.6. Define a family {L−a}a∈A of languages through the following simultaneous induction:
L−a 3 ϕ ::= p |2xψ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop and x ∈ A\{a} while ψ ∈L−x. Then the languageLalt is defined inductively by
Lalt 3 ϕ ::= p | χ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop and χ ∈⋃a∈AL−a.
Note that
⋃
a∈AL−a does not cover all ofLalt . For example, when A= {a,b} with a 6= b, 2a p∧2b p
is inLalt but not in
⋃
x∈AL−x.
It is not hard to verify that the two definitions above are equivalent, suggesting that our formal
definitions captures the intended intuition. Due to limited space, we omit the proof of this equivalence,
but the idea is simply to examine the parsing trees of formulas.
Proposition 2.7. For any ϕ ∈L , ϕ is agent alternating iff ϕ ∈Lalt .
3 Collapsing logics byLalt
We now investigate which logics are indistinguishable by formulas inLalt . For any normal modal logic
L (defined as a set of formulas in L satisfying the usual closure properties), let L|alt := L∩Lalt . Then
the general question is: for which modal logics L and L′ are L|alt and L′|alt the same?
More specifically, since we are mainly interested in the introspection axioms 4 and 5, we focus on
the logics appearing in the classic modal logic cube shown in Figure 1 below.6 Our main result is that
the two shaded areas in Figure 1 are collapsed inLalt but no other logics are. To establish this result, we
need to first develop bisimulation and unraveling concepts for agent-alternating formulas.
Notation 3.1. For convenience, we consider alt as an object not in A. Also for any set L ′ of formulas,
M ,u≡L ′ N ,v means that for all ϕ ∈L ′,M ,u |= ϕ iffN ,v |= ϕ .
Definition 3.2 (Agent-alternating bisimulation relation). An agent-alternating bisimulation family be-
tween two models M and N is a family of binary relations {a}a∈A∪{alt} between M and N such
that for every a ∈ A∪{alt} and every u ∈M and v ∈N such that ua v:
• (Atom) for all p ∈ Prop, u ∈VM (p) iff v ∈VN (p);
6Figure 1 is reproduced from [7].
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• (Zig) for all b ∈ A\{a} and u′ ∈ RMx (u), there is v′ ∈ RNx (v) such that u′b v′;
• (Zag) for all b ∈ A\{a} and v′ ∈ RNx (v), there is u′ ∈ RMx (u) such that u′b v′.
Then we say M ,u is agent-alternating bisimilar to N ,v if there is an agent-alternating bisimulation
family {a}a∈A∪{alt} betweenM andN such that ualt v.
Lemma 3.3. For any modelsM andN , agent-alternating bisimulation family {a}a∈A∪{alt} between
M andN , and a ∈ A, if ua v, thenM ,u≡L−a N ,v, and if ualt v, thenM ,u≡Lalt N ,v.
Proof. A simple induction on modal depth.
Definition 3.4 (Agent-alternating unraveling). Given a model M = 〈WM ,{RMa }a∈A,VM 〉, its agent-
alternating unravelings are all models of the form 〈S,{Ra}a∈A,V 〉 satisfying the following conditions:
• S is the set of all nonempty finite sequences s of pairs in (A∪{alt})×WM such that
(1) s1 ∈ {alt}×WM ,
(2) si ∈ A×WM for all i = 2 . . . len(t), and
(3) letting 〈ai,wi〉= si for all i= 1 . . . len(s), wiRMai+1wi+1 and ai 6= ai+1 for all i= 1 . . . len(s)−1;
• for all a ∈ A∪{alt} and s ∈ S such that slen(s) = 〈a,w〉, for all b ∈ A \ {a}, Rb(s) = {s+ 〈b,w′〉 |
w ∈ RMb (w))} (note that this is precisely {t ∈ S | s = t1...len(t)−1, tlen(t) ∈ {b}×WM };
• for every s ∈ S and p ∈ Prop, s ∈V (p) iff slen(s) ∈ (A∪{alt})×VM (p).
Let Alt(M ) denote the set of all agent alternating unraveling of M . Then for every N ∈ Alt(M ),
we define a family of binary relations betweenM andN , which we denote as {PNa }a∈A∪{alt}, by
uPNa s ⇐⇒ slen(s) = 〈a,u〉.
Lemma 3.5. For any modelM andN ∈ Alt(M ), {PNa }a∈A∪{alt} is an agent-alternating bisimulation
family betweenM andN . Consequently, by Lemma 3.3, for every w ∈M ,M ,w≡Lalt N ,〈〈alt,w〉〉.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 3.4 and the recursive structure ofLalt as defined in Definition 2.6.
Now we can formally state our main result.
Theorem 3.6. Among the systems displayed in Figure 1:
1. K|alt = K4|alt = K5|alt = K45|alt = KB|alt;
2. KD|alt = KD4|alt = KD5|alt = KD45|alt = KDB|alt;
3. no other collapse happens when restricting toLalt .
The results are summarized in Figure 2, where systems in the same shaded region in Figure 1 collapse.
Proof. Combining Proposition 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 below, we have all the collapsing and non-collapsing
results in the three layers of Figure 1. To see that the three layers do not collapse, it is enough to observe
that the axioms D and T are inLalt .
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K4
T
KD
KB
KDB
B
K
K45
K5
KB5
KD4 KD45
KD5
S4 S5
Figure 1: Systems of interest
T|alt
KD|alt
(= KD4|alt ,KD5|alt ,
KD45|alt ,KDB|alt)
B|alt
K|alt
(= K4|alt ,K5|alt ,
K45|alt ,KB|alt)
KB5|alt
S4|alt S5|alt
Figure 2: Systems when restricted toLalt
Proposition 3.7 (Collapsing 4 and 5). K|alt = K45|alt and KD|alt = KD45|alt
Proof. The right-to-left direction of both equations is trivial. For the left-to-right direction, by complete-
ness, we need only show that for every ϕ ∈ Lalt , if ϕ is satisfied by a pointed model, then it is also
satisfied by a pointed model based on a transitive and Euclidean frame. Further, if the first model is
based on a serial frame, then the frame of the second model is also serial. So it is enough to show the
following: for every pointed modelM ,u, there exists a pointed modelN ,v such that:
1. if for every a ∈ A, RMa is serial, then for every a ∈ A, RNa is also serial;
2. for every a ∈ A, RNa is transitive and Euclidean;
3. M ,u≡Lalt N ,v.
Now let N = 〈S,{Ra}a∈A,V 〉 be constructed by adding to the definition of being in Alt(M ) as in
Definition 3.4 the following:
• for all a ∈ A and s ∈ S such that slen(s) ∈ {a}×WM , Ra(s) = Ra(s1...len(s)−1).
This construction is possible because crucially the definition of being an agent-alternating unraveling
of M is silent on what Ra(s) should be when s ends in {a}×WM for a ∈ A. Also, when s ends in
{a}×WM for some a ∈ A, len(s) > 1 and s1...len(s)−1 does not end in {a}×WM , which means that
Ra(s1...len(s)−1) is defined in Definition 3.4.
Now we can show that N ,〈〈alt,u〉〉 satisfies all the requirements. It is not hard to see that if M
is serial, then so is N . The key observation is that for any s ∈ S, letting 〈a,w〉 = slen(s), Ra(s) must
include s, and Rb(s) for any b ∈ A \ {s} must be nonempty since RMb (w) is nonempty. Hence we are
done with (1). To see that for every a ∈ A, Ra is transitive and Euclidean, note that for any s ∈ S, letting
〈x,w〉= slen(s), we have the following:
• If x 6= a, then for every t ∈ Ra(s), t ends in {a}×WM , and t1...len(t)−1 = s. This means that our
construction above applies to t and Ra(t) = Ra(s).
• If x = a, then our construction above applies to s: letting s0 = s1...len(s)−1, s0 does not end in
{a}×WM , and Ra(s) = Ra(s0) by our definition. Then it is easy to see that for every t ∈ Ra(s),
t ∈ Ra(s0), and t1...len(t)−1 is also s0. This means that t ends in {a}×WM , and our construction
above also applies to t. Hence Ra(t) = Ra(s0) = Ra(s).
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Adding the above two points together, we have shown that for every s ∈ S and t ∈ Ra(s), Ra(t) = Ra(s).
This is precisely transitivity plus Euclideanness.
By Lemma 3.5, M ,u ≡Lalt N ,〈〈alt,u〉〉 since {PNa }a∈A∪{alt} is an agent-alternating bisimulation
family and uPNalt 〈〈alt,u〉〉. Thus, all three requirements are satisfied, so we are done.
Proposition 3.8 (Collapsing B). K|alt = KB|alt and KD|alt = KDB|alt
Proof. Following the strategy of the proof of Proposition 3.7, we only need to show that for every pointed
modelM ,u, there exists an agent-alternating unravelingN = 〈S,{Ra}a∈A,V 〉 ofM such that for every
a ∈ A, Ra is symmetric.
Indeed, letN be the agent-alternating unraveling ofM such that for every a ∈ A and s ∈ S such that
slen(s) ∈ {a}×WM , Ra(s) = {s1...len(s)−1}. Then it is easy to see that for every a ∈ A, Ra is symmetric:
for every s, t ∈ S, if sRat, then we have the following.
• If slen(s) ∈ {a}×WM , then t must be s1...len(s)−1 by our construction. By the definition of unravel-
ing, tRas.
• If slen(s) 6∈ {a}×WM , then t must be s+ 〈a,w〉 for some w such that letting 〈b,w0〉 = slen(s),
w0RMa w. Then our construction applies to t and tRas.
Putting the above two points together, Ra is symmetric, so we are done.
Proposition 3.9 (Non-collapsing results). B|alt \S4|alt , S4|alt \B|alt , KB5|alt \S4|alt , KB5|alt \B|alt are
all nonempty.
Proof. Let a,b be two different elements in A. In B (= KTB), we have the following theorems.
`B 2b2a p→2a p (1)[T]
`B 3a2b2a p→3a2a p (2)[RM,1]
`B 3a2a p→ p (3)[B]
`B 3a2b2a p→ p (4)[MP,2,3].
Now the last formula, formula (4), is agent-alternating. However, 6`S4 (4). Using soundness, it is enough
to find an S4 model refuting (4). Consider the following model:
w1 w2
pM
a
a,ba,b
By focusing on the restriction of M to a and b, respectively, it is easy to see that M is based on an S4
frame. Indeed, the accessibility relation for b is even an equivalence relation. Now,M ,w1 |=3a2b2a p
since M ,w2 |= 2b2a p. Also we have M ,w1 6|= p. Hence M ,w1 6|= (4), and thus 6`S4 (4). This shows
that B|alt \S4|alt is nonempty.
In the same spirit, 3a2b3a p→ 3a p ∈ S4|alt \B|alt . The derivation of 3a2b3a p→ 3a p in S4 is
essentially the same as above: using T we can eliminate the 2b in between the two 3a’s. A symmetric
countermodel of this formula is as follows.
Y. Ding, W. H. Holliday, & C. Zhang 129
w1 w2 w3
pM ′
a a
a,ba,ba,b
In KB5 we do not have the T axiom. So 3a2b2a p→ p and 3a2b3a p→ 3a p are not in KB5.
However, we only need to add 2a3b(p∨¬p) to the antecedents. Specifically, note that the formula
(3b(p∨¬p)∧2bq)→ q is in KB5. Hence:
• 3a(3b(p∨¬p)∧2b2a p)→ p ∈ KB5|alt \S4|alt ;
• 3a(3b(p∨¬p)∧2b3a p)→3a p ∈ KB5|alt \B|alt .
Their derivations in KB5 are in the same spirit as above, andM andM ′ can be reused.
4 Agent-nonrepeating formulas
The above non-collapsing results raise a natural question: is there a smaller fragment defined in the same
spirit that also collapses S5 to T? Recall that the non-collapsing results are witnessed by formulas like
3a2b3a p→3a p. When 2b is factive, agent a is ipso facto introspecting since we can eliminate 2b by
T. In this section we identify a fragment of agent-nonrepeating formulas in which this cannot happen
and S5 does collapse to T. The key idea is that we need to forbid 2a to appear at all in the scope of 2a.
Again, to formalize this idea, we provide an occurrence-based definition and an inductive definition.
Definition 4.1. A formula ϕ ∈L is an agent-nonrepeating formula iff for any a ∈ A and 2a occurrence
O[2aα], there is no other 2a occurrence O[2aβ ] such that O[2aβ ]≤ O[2aα]
Definition 4.2. Define a family {LX}X⊆A of fragments ofL through the following simultaneous induc-
tion:
LX 3 ϕ ::= p |2xψ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop and x ∈ X while ψ ∈LX\{x}.
The following equivalence is easily verified.
Proposition 4.3. For any ϕ ∈L , ϕ ∈LA iff ϕ is agent nonrepeating.
As before, we need a notion of bisimulation appropriate for the fragment.
Definition 4.4. An agent-nonrepeating bisimulation family between two modelsM andN is a family
of binary relations {X}X⊆A betweenM andN such that for every X ⊆ A and every u∈M and v∈N
such that uX v:
• (Atom) for all p ∈ Prop, u ∈VM (p) iff v ∈VN (p);
• (Zig) for all x ∈ X and u′ ∈ RMx (u), there is v′ ∈ RNx (v) such that u′X\{x} v′;
• (Zag) for all x ∈ X and v′ ∈ RNx (v), there is u′ ∈ RMx (u) such that u′X\{x} v′.
Then we sayM ,u is agent-nonrepeating bisimilar toN ,v if there is an agent-nonrepeating bisimulation
family {X}X⊆A betweenM andN such that uA v.
Lemma 4.5. For any models M and N , agent-nonrepeating bisimulation family {X}X⊆A between
M and N , and X ⊆ A, if uX v, then M ,u ≡LX N ,v. Hence whenever M ,u is agent-nonrepeating
bisimilar toN ,v, we haveM ,u≡LA N ,v.
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For any logic L, we write L|nr for L∩LA. We can now prove the desired collapse result.
Theorem 4.6. For every reflexive pointed modelM ,w, there is a partition modelN ,w′ such thatM ,w
is agent-nonrepeating bisimilar toN ,w′. Consequently, T|nr = S5|nr.
Proof. LetM be a reflexive model. We constructN = 〈S,{Ra}a∈A,V 〉. Let S be the set of all nonempty
finite sequences s of pairs in℘(A)×WM such that, letting s = 〈〈Xi,wi〉〉i=1...len(s), (1) X1 = A, and (2)
for all i = 1 . . . len(s)−1 and Xi+1 ( Xi, there is a ∈ A such that Xi = Xi+1∪{a} and wiRMa wi+1.
To make the rest of the construction easier, we make a few auxiliary definitions. For each s∈ S, define
LastA(s) to be ∗ 6∈ A when len(s) = 1 and otherwise the a∈ X \X0 with 〈X ,u〉= slen(s) and 〈X0,u0〉 when
slen(s)−1. Intuitively, LastA(s) denotes the last accessibility relation used in the sequence s. It is easy to
observe from the definition above that for any s ∈ S with 〈X ,u〉 = slen(s), LastA(s) 6∈ X , and moreover
when len(s)> 1, slen(s)−1 = 〈X ∪LastA(s),u0〉 for a u0 ∈M such that u0RMLastA(s)u.
Then for any a ∈ A and s ∈ S, define s<a to be s if a 6= LastA(s) and otherwise s1...len(s)−1. Intuitively
this is the a-predecessor of s in S. Now Ra is defined for each a∈A by the condition that sRat iff s<a = t<a
for all s, t ∈ S. With this definition, it is not hard to compute Ra(s) specifically. For all s ∈ S such that
len(s)> 1, letting slen(s) = 〈X ,u〉, slen(s)−1 = 〈X0,u0〉 and s0 = s1...len(s)−1, we have the following.
• For all a ∈ X , Ra(s) = {s+ 〈X \{a},v〉 | v ∈ RMa (u)}∪{s}.
• For the a ∈ X0 \X (namely LastA(s)), Ra(s) = {s0}∪{s0+ 〈X ,u′〉 | u0RMa u′}.
• For a ∈ A\X0, Ra(s) = {s}.
For all s ∈ S such that len(s) = 1, in which case s = 〈A,u〉 for some u ∈WM , we have that Ra(s) =
{s+ 〈A\{a},v〉 | v ∈ RMa (u)}∪{s}.
The valuation V is defined as usual. For every s ∈ S and p ∈ Prop, s ∈ V (p) iff slen(s) ∈℘(A)×
VM (p). That is, s ∈V (p) iff the second coordinate of slen(s) is in VM (p).
Then there is a natural family {X}X∈℘(A) of relations betweenM andN defined by
uX s ⇐⇒ slen(s) = 〈Y,u〉 with X ⊆ Y.
Now we are left with two tasks: to show thatN is a partition model and to show that {X}X∈℘(A)
is an agent-nonrepeating bisimulation family betweenM andN . ThatN is a partition model is clear:
for any a ∈ A, we defined Ra by an equality condition. Now we show that {X}X∈℘(A) is an agent-
nonrepeating bisimulation family. Pick arbitrary u ∈M ,s ∈ S, and X ∈℘(A) such that uX s. By
definition, slen(s) = 〈Y,u〉 for some Y ⊇ X . The (Atom) clause is trivial. For the (Zig) clause, pick
an arbitrary a ∈ X and v ∈ RMa (u). Then we see that s+ 〈Y \ {a},v〉 witnesses the requirement, as
s+〈Y \{a},v〉 ∈ Ra(s) and vX\{a} s+〈Y \{a},v〉 because from X ⊆Y we have X \{a} ⊆Y \{a}. For
the (Zag) clause, we need to use the fact that M is reflexive. Picking an arbitrary a ∈ X and t ∈ Ra(s),
we know that a ∈ Y and hence there are two cases for t:
• t = s. Then u itself witnesses the requirement, as uX\{a} s and uRMa u.
• t = s+ 〈Y \{a},v〉 for some v ∈M such that uRMa v. Then clearly v is witnesses the requirement.
In summary, N ,〈〈A,w〉〉 is a pointed partition model, and M ,w is agent-nonrepeating bisimilar to
it. Hence we are done.
With the help of the above theorem, we obtain the poset of logics in Figure 3 when restricted toLA.
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K|nr
(= K4|nr,K5|nr,
K45|nr,KB|nr)
KD|nr
(= KD4|nr,KD5|nr,
KD45|nr,KDB|nr)
T|nr
(= S4|nr,B|nr,
S5|nr.
KB5|nr
Figure 3: Systems when restricted toLA
Theorem 4.7. Among the systems displayed in Figure 1:
1. K|nr = K4|nr = K5|nr = K45|nr = KB|nr;
2. KD|nr = KD4|nr = KD5|nr = KD45|nr = KDB|nr;
3. T|nr = S4|nr = B|nr = S5|nr;
4. no other collapse happens when restricting toLA.
The results are summarized in Figure 3.
Proof. Since LA ⊆Lalt , all collapsing results in Theorem 3.6 obtain. This covers (1) and (2). Due to
Theorem 4.6, we have (3). Clearly KB5|nr ⊆ S5|nr since the T axiom is inLA. Hence we are left to show
that KB5|nr is not in KD|nr. The witness is simply (3a(p∨¬p)∧2a p)→ p.
5 Allowing the standard common belief operator?
Given its importance in many applications, it is natural to consider adding the standard common belief
operator to Lalt and investigate the resulting collapse of logics. In this section, we provide three non-
collapsing results for the axioms 4 and 5, and leave a full investigation with possible collapsing results for
future work. Given that Cp expresses a potentially infinitary conjunction of formulas where modalities
are compounded in arbitrary order, implicitly Cp is not agent alternating: formulas like 2a2a p are part
of the definition of Cp. Hence it is not surprising that we get many non-collapsing results. Moreover,
we face the problem of whether to allow C to be in the scope of or scope over any 2a or itself. Again
the reason is that if we expand C2a p or CCp syntactically as infinitary formulas, 2a will scope over
an occurrence of 2a immediately. Hence it is not obvious what is the most appropriate definition of an
agent-alternating fragment in a language with a common belief operator, and a full investigation would
require a hierarchy of fragments, each allowing more interactions between C and other modalities or C
itself. Our non-collapsing results about 4 also crucially rely on A being finite. We conjecture that the
collapsing situation would change radically when A is infinite.
Now let us fix the language and semantics for the common belief operator.
Definition 5.1. Let C be defined by adding new clauses Cϕ and Eϕ to L ’s context-free grammars.
Semantically, M ,u |= Eϕ iff for all v ∈M such that u(⋃a∈A RMa )v, M ,v |= ϕ , and M ,u |=Cϕ iff for
all v ∈M such that u(⋃a∈A RMa )+v, M ,v |= ϕ , where (⋃a∈A RMa )+ means the transitive closure of the
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union of relations in {RMa }a∈A. Hence Eϕ formalizes “everyone believes ϕ ,” and Cϕ formalizes “it is
commonly believed that ϕ .”
Our logics must expand as well, as we need to add the axioms and rules for the C and E operators. To
avoid choosing particular axiomatizations, we define logics directly as validities. For any L⊆L , let CL
denote the set of formulas inC that are valid on all frames that validates L. For particular axiomatizations,
see [12]. For our purposes, it is enough to note that for any L, the followings formulas are in CL.
(Cp∧C(p→ q))→Cq (E p∧E(p→ q))→ Eq
(C(p→ E p)∧E p)→Cp E p→2a p
Cp→ E(p∧Cp)
∧
a∈A
2a p→ E p (when A is finite).
Then we can identify at least two E-free fragments: one in which C is not allowed to interact with 2a
but allowed to interact with C, and one in which C can appear arbitrarily.
Definition 5.2. Let C p be the fragment of formulas in C with C the only appearing modality. Then let
LaltC
p be the fragment consisting of Boolean combinations of formulas inLalt and C p.
Definition 5.3. Let Calt and C−a for any a ∈ A be defined by adding a new clause Cϕ toLalt andL−a’s
context-free grammars.
For example, 2aCϕ is in Calt but not inLaltC p. Note thatLaltC p ⊆ Calt . Hence for non-collapsing
results, usingLaltC p would be stronger.
Now we present the non-collapsing results. The situation with the 5 axiom is relatively simple. Even
in the smaller fragmentLaltC p and even with the D axiom, 5 is still important.
Proposition 5.4. CK5∩LaltC p is not contained in CKD∩LaltC p. The formula χ5 = (3a p∧3a¬p)→
Ĉ(p∧Ĉ¬p) is the witness.
Proof. Clearly the following model proves the claim. All accessibility relations are the same, so we are
not labeling the arrows.
w2 w1 w3
pM
For the 4 axiom we provide two non-collapsing results. First, in LaltC p, CK4 does not collapse to
CK when A is finite.
Proposition 5.5. CK4∩LaltC p is not contained in CK∩LaltC p. The witness is the formula χ4 =
(
∧
x∈A\{a}(2x⊥∧2a2x⊥)∧2a p)→Cp.
Proof. The idea is essentially the same as the proof of the next proposition, Proposition 5.6.
The formula in the previous proposition does not separate CKD4 from CKD, as it is trivially valid in
CKD for the reason that 2b⊥ is inconsistent. Here we provide a formula not in LaltC p but in Calt that
separates CKD4 from CKD, again assuming that A is finite.
Proposition 5.6. CKD4∩Calt is not contained in CKD∩Calt . The witness is the following formula χD4: ∧
b∈A\{a}
(2b p∧C2b p∧2b2a p∧C2b2a p)∧2a p
→Cp.
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Proof. Clearly χD4 is in Calt . To see that it is in CK4, recall that the introduction axiom for common
belief is
(C(ϕ → Eϕ)∧E2aϕ)→Cϕ.
Note that E2a p is derivable from the antecedent of χD4, as 2b2a p for any b ∈ A\{a} is already in the
antecedent, and 2a2a p follows from 2a p by 4. Hence we only need C(p→ E p). It is enough to show
CE p and in fact C2a p, as for every b∈ A\{a}, C2b p is already in the antecedent of χD4. By the C-intro
axiom again, we only need to derive E2a p and C(2a p→ E2a p). We already dealt with E2a p, so we
are left with C(2a p→ E2a p). For any b ∈ A\{a}, C(2a p→ 2b2a p) follows from C2b2a p, which is
already in the antecedent of χD4. For the case of C(2a p→2a2a p), we only need to necessitate 4.
Semantically, consider an arbitrary transitive model and a world u in the model. For any v that is
reachable from u, there are only the following cases.
• Only Ra is used. Then 2a p being true at u is enough to make p true at v, by transitivity.
• Only Rb is used for b ∈ A\{a}. Since 2b p is true at u, similarly p is true at v.
• The last step is in Ra, and the last non-a step is Rb. Then depending on if there is a step before the
last Rb step, 2b2a p or C2b2a p being true at u guarantees p’s being true at v.
• The last step is in Rb for some b ∈ A\{a}, and Rb is not the only relation used. Then C2b p being
true at u guarantees that p is true at v.
Hence p is true at v no matter how v is reached from u. Thus, Cp is true at u.
Now to see that χD4 is not in CKD, consider the following model.
w1
p
w2
p
w3
v1
p
M a a
a
a
bb b
a,b
This modelM has all relations serial. Note that at any world, a b step moves you to v1, which makes p
and Cp true. Note that 2a p is also true at w1. Hence the antecedent is true at w1. But clearly Cp is false
at w1, as w3 is reachable but p is false at w3. Thus, χD4 is not in CKD.
6 Discussion
In the introduction, we suggested that Lalt is sufficient to formalize agents’ multi-agent epistemic rea-
soning in many cases, especially in games. As shown in Appendix B, this claim is substantial if we do
not assume both introspection axioms 4 and 5, for then there is a loss of expressivity in moving fromL
toLalt . There remains the question of how widely it is true thatLalt is sufficient to formalize multi-agent
epistemic reasoning. In concrete games, it may well be that there is a brute fact ϕ that is not expressible
in Lalt , yet for agents to do well in this game, they must reason about ϕ . For example, when twins
are playing games, there seems to be motivation for them to introspect and reason about themselves. A
formal study of this question would complement our work and contribute to answering the question of
to what extent introspection axioms matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning.
In § 4, we identified one fragment, the fragment of agent-nonrepeating formulas, with respect to
which S5 collapses to T. It is not too hard to see that the expressivity of this fragment is extremely
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poor. For example, there is a bound on the modal depth of the formulas in this fragment when A is finite.
It remains an open question whether there is an expressively more satisfying fragment with a natural
syntactic definition that can collapse S5 to T.
In § 5, we noted that a full investigation of which fragments of C collapse which logics is left for
future research. In particular, there are two obvious questions. First, when we are separating CKD4 from
CKD, the formula we used is in Calt but not in LaltC p. The question here is whether LaltC p in fact
collapses CLD4 to CKD. Second, we did not consider the case where A is infinite. We conjecture that
when A is infinite,LaltC p and perhaps even Calt has the same collapsing power asLalt does.
The main reason for the complexity of the problem with C is that C is implicitly not agent alternating
and hence our unraveling technique does not apply directly. This motivates the formulation of an agent-
alternating common belief operator. Indeed, we need many versions of agent-alternating common belief.
For any subsets X and Y of A, we can define an operator XCY such that XCY p means that for any nonempty
agent alternating finite sequence l of elements in A such that l1 ∈ X and llen(l) ∈ Y , l1 believes that l2
believes that · · · llen(l) believes that p. The X and Y are here to make sure that XCY immediately scopes
over and is immediately in the scope of the right modalities. For example, 2aXCY2b p would be agent
alternating iff a 6∈ X and b 6∈ Y . It is not hard to see that the techniques in § 3 are enough to deal
with these operators, through a translation to infinitary languages allowing infinite conjunctions, as our
agent-alternating bisimulation families preserves truth values of even infinitary formulas.
Finally, our project can be naturally extended to any extension of the multi-agent doxastic/epistemic
language. Natural candidates include languages with dynamic operators, probability operators, or non-
standard knowledge operators. The central question to ask in each case is this: what would be a natural
agent-alternating fragment or a fragment sufficient for the intended application of those languages, and
how does restricting to this fragment affect the landscape of logics? We believe that this type of question
will generate interesting results and deepen our understanding of the realm of epistemic logics.
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A Rationalizability as agent-alternating common belief of rationality
In this appendix, we sketch a proof that rationality plus agent-alternating common belief of rationality,
in which one need not believe that oneself is rational, is enough for all agents to play their rationalizable
strategies. This is already implicit in one of the very first definitions of rationalizability by Bernheim [3],
where he carefully stipulated that agents cannot formulate “conjectures” about themselves in systems of
beliefs that rationalize their actions. We make this more explicit by using modal logic and Kripke models
of games in the style of [24] and [4].
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We utilize typical notation in game theory in this appendix. Let G= 〈{Sa}a∈A,{Ua}a∈A〉 be a strategic
form game: for all a ∈ A, Sa is a finite set and Ua is a function from Πa∈ASa to R, which then naturally
extends to ∆Πa∈ASa.
Following [4], we first pick a set of distinct proposition letters {ra | a ∈ A} ⊆ Prop. Then a model
M of G is a tuple 〈W,{Ra}a∈A,{Pa}a∈A,{σa}a∈A,V 〉 satisfying the following properties.
• W is a finite set.
• For any a ∈ A, Ra is serial binary relation on W .
• For any a ∈ A, Pa is a function from W to probability distributions on W such that for any w ∈W ,
Pa,w(Ra(w)) = 1.
• For any a ∈ A, σa is a function from W to Sa.
• V is a function from Prop to℘(W ).
• For any a ∈ A, w ∈ V (ra) iff σa(w) is a best response to what a believes her opponents play.
Formally, this condition is
∀sa ∈ Sa, ∑
w′∈Ra(w)
Pa,w(w′)Ua(σa(w),σ−a(w′))≥ ∑
w′∈Ra(w)
Pa,w(w′)Ua(sa,σ−a(w′)).
To formulate agent-alternating common belief of rationality, for each nonempty finite sequence l of
elements in A, let ρs be the formula2l12l2 · · ·2llen(l)−1rllen(l) . For example, ρ〈a〉 = ra and ρ〈a,b,a〉 =2a2bra.
Then let Γ be the set of ρl such that l is agent-alternating: for all i= 1 . . . len(l)−1, li 6= li+1. This Γ then
encodes agent-alternating common belief of rationality.
With these definitions, it easily follows that ifM ,w |= Γ, then for each a∈ A, σa(w) is a strategy that
survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. To show this, we can simply adapt the
proof in [24]. For each a ∈ A, collect σa(w′) in Qa for each w′ ∈W such that there is an agent-alternating
path from w to w′ with the last move not using Ra. Then it is not hard to see that for any a ∈ A and
qa ∈ Qa, qa is not strictly dominated by any strategy in ∆Qa assuming any opponent b ∈ A \ {a} only
plays strategies in Qb. Indeed, given that qa is in Qa, by definition there is w′ ∈W and w1,w2, . . . ,wn and
a1,a2, · · · ,an 6= a such that w1 = w, wn = w′, an 6= a, and for all i = 1 . . .n−1, wiRiwi+1 and ai 6= ai+1.
Then for each w′′ ∈ Ra(w′), σ−a(w′′)∈Q−a as w′′ is reachable from w using a1,a2, · · · ,an,a which is still
an alternating sequence. Note also thatM ,w |= Γ and in particularM ,w |= 2a12a2 · · ·2an−1ran . Hence
M ,w′ |= ra, and qa is the best response to the mixture m−a of 〈σ−a(w′′) |w′′ ∈ Ra(w′)〉 using Pa,w′ , which
is a mixture of Q−a since each σ−a(w′′) ∈ Q−a. Thus qa is not strictly dominated by any mixture ma of
Qa: if ma strictly dominates qa on any q−a ∈ Q−a, then ma strictly dominates qa on m−a, and then qa is
not the best response to m−a, a contradiction. Thus each Qa survives each stage of elimination. Now for
each a∈ A, σa(w)∈Qa, since we can use the trivially agent-alternating path w1 =w and a1 = b∈ A\{a}
(recall that |A|> 1). Hence the strategy σq(w) played at w is a strategy that survives iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies.
We may also express agents’ belief that their opponents’ actions are independent by proposition
letters. Then agent-alternating common belief that agents believe that their opponents’ actions are inde-
pendent can be expressed using modal formulas. To this end, first fix another set {r′a | a ∈ A} ⊆ Prop
of distinct proposition letters such that {r′a | a ∈ A}∩{ra | a ∈ A} = ∅. The intended interpretation of
r′a is that a believes that her opponents’ actions are independent. Hence we require that for any a ∈ A,
w ∈ V (r′a) iff Pa,w({w′ ∈ Ra(w) | σ−a(w′) = s−a}) = Πb∈A\{a}Pa,w({w′ ∈ Ra(w) | σb(w′) = s−a(b)}) for
any s−a ∈ S−a. Then similar to the definition of ρl , for any alternating sequence l of elements in A, we
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define ρ ′l with the trailing proposition letter being r
′
llen(l)
, and we let Γ′ be the set of all such ρ ′l ’s. With this
setup, it is not hard to see, using the same strategy as above, that if M ,w |= Γ∪Γ′, then for any a ∈ A,
σa(w) is a rationalizable strategy for a.
B Expressivity ofLalt
In this appendix we study the influence of the introspection axioms on the expressivity ofLalt . We first
define finite agent-alternating bisimulations so we can give a more quantitative analysis of expressivity.
Definition B.1. By induction on n, let binary relations {n−a}a∈A be defined on all pointed models as
follows:
• M ,u0−a N ,v iff VM (u) =VN (v).
• M ,un+1−a N ,v iff
– (Atom) VM (u) =VM (v) and
– ∀b ∈ A\{a}
∗ (b-zig) ∀x ∈ RMb (u) ∃y ∈ RNb (v)M ,xn−b N ,y and
∗ (b-zag) ∀y ∈ RNb (v) ∃x ∈ RMb (u)M ,xn−b N ,y.
Then let0alt be defined in the same way as0−a for any a ∈ A, and definen+1alt by
• (Atom) VM (u) =VM (v) and
• ∀b ∈ A
– (b-zig) ∀x ∈ RMb (u) ∃y ∈ RNb (v)M ,xn−b N ,y and
– (b-zag) ∀y ∈ RNb (v) ∃x ∈ RMb (u)M ,xn−b N ,y.
Then for x ∈ A∪{alt}, letωx be the intersection of {nx}n∈N.
Proposition B.2. For all n ∈ N and a ∈ A, n−a is an equivalence relation. Consequently, nalt is an
equivalence relation for all n ∈ N.
Theorem B.3. For any n ∈ N and pointed modelsM ,u andN ,v:
• M ,u≡L n−a N ,v ifM ,un−a N ,v;
• M ,u≡L nalt N ,v ifM ,unalt N ,v;
• M ,u≡L−a N ,v ifM ,uω−a N ,v;
• M ,u≡Lalt N ,v ifM ,uωalt N ,v.
Letn denote the usual n-bisimulation relation andω the intersection of {n}n∈N.
Now we can present our main results in this appendix. First, with both introspection axioms, there is
no loss of expressivity at each modal depth in moving fromL toLalt .
Proposition B.4. Letting K45 be the class of pointed models where each Ra is transitive and Euclidean,
n∩K452 =nalt ∩K452 for all n ∈ N.
Proof. If |A| = 1, then1∩K452 =2∩K452 =n∩K452 for all n ≥ 1. It is also easy to see that
1alt =1. Hence1alt ∩K452 =n∩K452 for all n. The required proposition follows immediately.
Now we assume |A| > 1 and prove the claim by induction on n. The case for n = 0 is trivial. Now
suppose n ∩K452 =nalt ∩K452, and let us show that the claim is true for n+ 1. The left-to-right
subset relation is trivial. Hence let us pick two arbitrary pointed models M ,u and N ,v in K45 such
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that M ,un+1alt N ,u. Now we need to show that M ,un+1 N ,v. That they have the same atomic
valuation is trivial. Now pick an arbitrary b ∈ A and u′ such that uRMb u′ in M . Our goal is then to find
a v′ such that vRNb v
′ and M ,u′n N ,v′. Pick some a ∈ A \ {b} (note that we assumed that |A| > 1)
so that b ∈ A\{a}. By the definition ofn+1alt , M ,un+1−a N ,v. Then we obtain a v′ such that vRNb v′
and M ,u′n−b N ,v′. Now we show that this v′ is what we need: M ,u′n N ,v′. By the induction
hypothesis, it is enough to show thatM ,u′nalt N ,v′.
Thus, pick an arbitrary x ∈ A. We need to show that M ,u′ n−x N ,v′. The case for the atomic
valuation is again trivial. Now we need to show y-zig and y-zag for all y ∈ A\{x}. When y 6= b, they are
part of the definition of n−b, which holds between M ,u′ and N ,v′. Hence we are left with the case
where y = b. For b-zig, pick an arbitrary u′′ such that u′RMb u
′′. Recall that uRMb u
′ and Rb is transitive.
Hence uRMb u
′′. ApplyingM ,un+1−a N ,v, we obtain v′′ such that vRNb v′′ andM ,u′′−b N ,v′′. But
RNb is Euclidean and vR
N
b v
′ too. Hence vRN v′′. Thus this v′′ witnesses the b-zig clause forM ,u′n−x
N ,v′. b-zag is shown symmetrically, where the transitivity of RNb and the Euclideanness of R
M
b are
used. The zag clause forM ,un+1 N ,v is also shown symmetrically.
However, if we consider frame classes corresponding to the modal logic cube as in Figure 1, having
both introspection properties is necessary.
Proposition B.5. Letting S4 (resp. KD5, B) be the class of pointed models where each Ra is reflexive
and transitive (resp. serial and Euclidean, reflexive and symmetrical), we haveωalt ∩S42 6⊆2∩S42,
ωalt ∩KD52 6⊆2∩KD52, andωalt ∩B2 6⊆2∩B2.
Proof. The following two models deal with the S4 case. Reflexive loops are omitted. The dashed arrows
represent relations for a, and the solid ones represent relations for all agents in A beside a.
l1 r1
l2 r2
p
l3
p
r3M
l′1 r
′
1
l′1 r
′
2
p
l′1
p
r′3N
Then we have an agent-alternating family {a}a∈A∪{alt} of bisimulations. For any i ∈ {1,2,3} and
b ∈ A\{a}:
• lia l′i ,r′i and ria l′i ,r′i;
• lib l′i and rib r′i.
Essentially the nodes on the same level are connected by a, and the left column in M is connected
to the left column of N byb, and similarly the right column in M is connected to the right column
of N by b. Finally it enough to just connect l1 with l′1 by alt . Then it is not hard to check that
{a}a∈A∪{alt} is indeed an agent-alternating bisimulation family. By a simple induction, this clearly
implies thatM , l1ωalt N , l′1. But of courseM , l1 62N , l′1 sinceM , l1 |=3a3a p butN , l′1 6|=3a3a p.
The following two models deal with the KD5 case.
Y. Ding, W. H. Holliday, & C. Zhang 139
m1
m2
p
m3M
l1 r1
l2 r2
p
l3
p
r3N
This case is easier. For each i ∈ {1,2,3}, mi a li,ri and mi b ri. Then connecting m1 with r1 by
alt , we have an agent-alternating bisimulation family. Hence M ,m1 alt N ,r1. However, we have
M ,m1 |=3a3a p andN ,r1 6|=3a3a p.
Finally, the following two models deal with the B case. Again, the reflexive loops are omitted from
the diagram. The agent-alternating bisimulation family and the formula to refute2 we need to use are
the same as we used in the S4 case.
l1 r1
l2 r2
p
l3
p
r3M
l′1 r
′
1
l′2 r
′
2
p
l′3
p
r′3N
